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INTRODUCTION 
While addressing the UN general assembly in 1961, the President of the United States proposed 
to designate the decade of the 1960s as a UN ‘decade of development’ by saying, ’If the United 
States could commit itself to put a man on the moon before the end of the decade, it would 
certainly support the idea of improving the living standards of people in the poorest countries 
over the same period.’ (as quoted in Jolly et al 2004).  Kennedy’s statement has several 
conjectures alluding to the core of the UN debates on science and technology for development 
over almost half a century. Not only that the president compared putting a man on the moon –
hyped at that time as a giant technological achievement for mankind – with addressing poverty, 
unemployment and diseases in the developing countries, but that his statement could be 
interpreted to denote the order in which the industrialised nations like the United States 
prioritised their international aid obligations. More importantly, Kennedy’s comparison was 
based on the assumption that addressing development issues could be as easy as putting a man 
on the moon, because both affairs demanded nothing more than applying science and 
technology to the task at hand. This application had another caveat,  as the original Sussex 
Manifesto pointed out 40 years ago, i.e., President Kennedy proposed to apply science and 
technology developed primarily for the industrialised countries to the problems of the 
developing countries (Singer et al 1970).  
 
As we all know, a man did land on the moon by the turn of the 1960s, but development 
apparently needed yet another decade to be accomplished – the UN declared the 1970s as a 
second development decade. Forty years after a man landed on the moon, countries like India, 
which was considered among the poorest countries in the President Kennedy’s statement in 
1961, and which as part of the G-77 demanded greater assistance from the industrialised 
countries during the second development decade, has recently landed a man on the moon.  In 
so doing, India declared itself to be joining the league of space-faring nations including the US, 
Russia and Japan, while 40 per cent of India’s population is believed to be living below poverty 
line.   
 
This paper revisits a series of key moments during 50 years of UN debates and reflects on the 
genealogy of tropes of development and the ways in which these have been equated with 
science and technology. The paper unravels some of the fundamental philosophical 
assumptions on science and technology for development and reviews the direction in which 
these assumptions and corresponding practices in the UN have changed over the course of half 
a century. These changes do not simply denote chronological eras but represent political 
positions on the struggle in the international arena between north and south, rich and poor, and 
on the question of distribution and justice. This paper is therefore not an impact study of UN 
practices on development. Rather, it is an attempt to engage with the thinking of one of the 
most influential global institutions as a repertoire of ideas and practices on science and 
technology for development.   
BIRTH OF ‘DEVELOPMENT’: 1870 TO 1940 
The beginning of the concept and practice of development is often traced to the late colonial 
period between 1870 and 1940 when the colonial powers put the dominant ideas of the time 
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into practice and in this sense opened the way to what eventually came to be known as 
‘development’. It was a transitional period, one in which brutal power relations existed alongside 
paternalistic feelings of responsibility towards natives, who were supposed to be made ‘civilised’ 
(Watts 1995).  The colonial powers threw up an array of arguments to justify interventions 
outside of Europe. The League of Nations, the first such international organisation established in 
1919, which in many ways anticipated the UN, legitimised such interventions in the name of 
‘civilisation’. Articles 22 and 23 of the Convent of the League of Nations established the mandate 
system, according to which administrative responsibility for territorial possession was conferred 
upon certain League members, allowing intervention during time of war and otherwise. 
According to the mandate, the colonial powers had to account to the League for their 
administrative practices – the character of the mandate differing according to the stages of 
development, geographical situation, and economic conditions of the territory under possession 
(Rist 2002). This text of the League of Nations introduced the concept of ‘stages of 
development’ much before the influential notion of evolutionary development came alive on the 
international stage.  
 
The League of Nations inaugurated yet another concept, the subsequent versions of which 
created substantial tension in later UN practices. The League of Nations accepted a doctrine 
called the dual mandate. This stated that the colonial or administrative powers had dual 
responsibility towards protecting interests of both the natives and mankind as a whole for the 
benefit of world development (Rist 2002). This dual mandate was accepted in the League 
without slightest reference to the scenario in which the interests of natives could possibly 
conflict with humankind as a whole and vice versa. A great deal of UN debates on development 
in the 1960s and 1970s could be read as manifestation of the conflict between such dual 
mandates. The South asserted through the proposal of a New Economic International Order 
(NIEO) demanding a greater access to science and technology as an essential component for 
southern development, while the North insisted on investing in science and technology for the 
global benefit. This difference in the emphasis created intense conflict between the North and 
South, re-enacting the inherent tension in the dual mandate.  
 
The League of Nations opened up a political and symbolic space for international interaction – 
albeit with the absence of the United States and without explicit reference to the notion of 
development (not yet formed), but including global cooperation in science and technology. 
Following the creation of the League of Nations in 1919, the League of Nations Committee on 
Intellectual Cooperation was formed in 1922, which is considered as the predecessor of UNESCO 
(Standke 2006). In 1931, the scientific community created the International Council of Scientific 
Unions
1
 (ICSU) to promote international exchange in science (UNCTAD 1997). In fact the terms 
science and technology were not explicitly used in the Charter of the United Nations. Only the 
listing of the related fields in article 57 mentions science and technology (Standke 2006). 
However, the importance of international cooperation in science and technology to promote 
economic development was emphasised as early as 1949 by the United Nation’s scientific 
Conference on the Conservation and Utilisation of Resources held in New York. In the 1950s, the 
UN also addressed the peaceful use of atomic energy (UNCTAD 1997). However, the focus on 
‘science and technology for development’, which had a crucial impact on other UN debates, 
began with the birth of the concept of ‘underdevelopment’ on 20 January, 1949.  
                                               
1
 In 1998, ICSU changed its name to the International Council of Science, while retaining the same 
acronym. 
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EVOLUTION OF ‘DEVELOPMENT’: POST-WWII  
‘Underdevelopment began, then, on January 20, 1949. On that day two billion people became 
underdeveloped’, declares Gustavo Esteva (1992: 7). Kennedy’s predecessor, US President 
Truman, first used the word ‘underdevelopment’ in his inaugural address in 1949. In the same 
speech he first declared his unfaltering support to the United Nations and then divided the world 
in developed and underdeveloped nations before declaring the fourth point in his famous 
speech, ’We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped 
areas’ (Esteva 1992: 7).  As Esteva reflects, ‘…from that time [20 January 1949] on they [2 billion 
people] ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an 
inverted mirror of others reality: a mirror that belittles them and sends them off to the end of the 
queue’ (Esteva 1992: 7). Those who were declared underdeveloped were made to stand in the 
queue to access science and technology. The inaugural notion of underdevelopment was 
imagined at that time as an equation of the status of access to science and technology in a 
particular time and space.   
 
Apparently, the point about underdevelopment was not destined to be included in the 
President’s speech in the first place (Rist 2002). The speech writers first came up with three clear 
points for the inaugural speech – continuous support to the UN organisation, continuation of 
the European reconstruction through the Marshall Plan, and creation of a joint defense 
organisation to counter the Soviet threat. These were considered politically hot topics and were 
agreed upon in the first meeting. A civil servant later suggested that the technical assistance 
already granted to Latin America be extended to other poor countries in the world. The idea was 
taken on board as a public relations gimmick. The main headlines next day, however, were all 
about ‘Point Four’ (Rist 2002). Whether or not it was triggered by a sheer historical accident, the 
terminological innovation of ‘underdevelopment’ inaugurated a whole new way of conceiving 
international relations.  
 
The concern of underdevelopment, more positively described later as ‘economic development’, 
steadily grew in the postwar period, but more intensely in the 1950s when a number of countries 
were decolonised in Latin America and South and Southeast Asia. The global engagement with 
economic development then peaked in the 1960s when much of Africa was also decolonised.  
Richard Jolly et al modestly describe the core of development thinking during this period as 
‘Eurocentric’ (Jolly et al 2004: 49). Discussing UN contributions to development thinking and 
practice, Jolly et al further trace some fundamental assumptions in development thinking in the 
early post-war decades. First of all, economic development was not considered spontaneous as 
in the classical capitalist pattern; rather it was supposed to be consciously achieved through 
planning and interventionist strategies.  
 
Gilbert Rist makes a similar argument (Rist 2002). Rist suggests that with President Truman’s 
speech the phenomenon of development changed from being intransitive – something that 
simply happened as in Article 22 of the Convent of the League of Nations or in Marx and Lenin’s 
work on development of capitalism.  When described as ‘underdevelopment’, development took 
on a transitive meaning – the course of events could possibly be changed by intervention, by 
actions performed by one set of agents on the other (Rist 2002). Jolly et al further elaborates the 
means by which such intervention was envisaged in the UN. The sub-commission on the 
economic development created in 1946 within the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 
the UN largely conceived economic development as induced industrialisation (Jolly et al 2004). 
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In the wake of the new meaning of underdevelopment, and the topography of power relations 
between North and South becoming vertical, economic development of the less developed 
countries was modeled as catching up by following the experiences of the industrialised nations. 
INTERVENTION CATCH-PHRASES: FORMATIVE IMAGINARIES OF 
DEVELOPMENT THINKING  
Towards achieving economic development, some of the pioneering development economists of 
the early UN decades put considerable emphasis on initial interventions. ‘Igniting’ economic 
development was represented in a series of catchphrases and metaphors such as ‘take-off’, 
‘snowballing’, and ‘big-push’, which aptly captured the interventionist and evolutionary core of 
development thinking in this era.  For instance, the snowball metaphor described how the 
process had to begin by rolling the snowball up the mountain, but once it got there, the rest was 
easy. ’Once the snowball moves to roll downwards, it will move of its own momentum, and will 
get bigger and bigger as it goes along’ (Lewis, cited in Jolly et al 2004: 54). This was not yet an era 
of ‘trickle down’, it was in fact the time when the whole nation was being launched into the path 
of self-sustaining growth, a ‘little like getting an airplane off the ground’, as the famous 
economist Walt Rostow declared in yet another manifesto.  Rostow’s The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto later became a cult classic. For Rostow, development was 
akin to the ‘taking off’ of an aeronautical artefact. A ‘big push’ was needed to generate critical 
ground speed before the craft (a whole nation) could become airborne (as discussed in Jolly et al 
2004; Rist 2002).  
 
These formative imaginaries of development thinking were heavily influenced by the 
evolutionary thinking of Darwin. Rostow on his own admission described his work as essentially a 
‘biological field of economic growth’ (Rostow 1960:36) – but it would have lacked a real sparkle 
without Newton’s contribution on hydraulic physics.  How best to deliver the ‘Big Push’ – with 
science and technology forming the essential engine of this push – was the crux of the UN 
debates in the decades of 1960s and 1970s.  This was followed by the missing decade of the 
1980s when, failing to respond to ‘big push’ strategies, development was finally declared dead – 
and something new was born: environment. But before moving from the artefactual to the 
natural, a brief survey of the debates and politics around big-push is pertinent.  
DEVELOPMENT BY TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE: THE FIRST 
DEVELOPMENT DECADE 1960S  
The big push comprised two crucial elements: financial capital, and scientific and technological 
assistance. The UN debates in the first development decade were influenced by a great deal of 
uncritical optimism that the induction of science and technology would solve all social ills 
emanating from underdevelopment. In the early UN days, development of human resources and 
skills were considerably emphasised. Based on the UN resolution in 1948 and through the 
activities of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and UNESCO, diverse teams of 
international experts were organised for technical assistance to developing countries. EPTA – 
the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for economic development was established 
under ECOSOC in 1949, which after 15 years became UNDP (United Nations Development 
Programme) in 1965. At the time of the first UN Conference on the Application of Science and 
Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas in Geneva in 1963, the technical 
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assistance approach to development had come under heavy criticism. Inadequate diagnosis of 
the technical assistance needs; cost-effectiveness of sending costly expatriate technicians, 
teachers and other experts to developing countries; and recognition of the need to build in-
country institutional capacity on science and technology raised serious doubts about the 
success of technology-assisted development (UNCTAD 1997, Standke 2006).  
UN CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: GENEVA (1963) TO VIENNA (1979) 
The character of the discussion on the economic gap and how should it be bridged radically 
changed between two landmark UN conferences on science, technology and development – 
the first one organised in Geneva in 1963 and the second in Vienna in 1979. In the early years of 
the first development decade, the ‘snowballing’, ‘big push’ or ‘igniting’ of development approach 
was further intensified through the refined focus on planning for economic development. A 
great deal of emphasis was laid on national planning, especially among the newly decolonised 
countries in Asia and Latin America. Among the six major tasks identified by the report The 
United Nations Development Decade: Proposal for Action prepared in 1962, surveys of physical 
and human resources, and formulation of development plans in underdeveloped countries were 
emphasised. For many newly decolonised countries, like India, the development plan was the 
means by which the nation was being imagined and constructed. During this phase of 
developmental nationalism, most of the UN agencies were also involved with collecting, 
evaluating and analysing data for development and projecting this data into models of 
development (Jolly et al 2004).  
 
During the phase of planned development leading up to the 1963 Geneva conference, science 
was the point of focus.  By the time of the UN Conference on Science, Technology and 
Development (UNCSTD) in Vienna in 1979, science was gradually replaced by technology as a 
key political factor in North-South relations. At the beginning of the first development decade, 
science was regarded as a global good. Geneva was accordingly mainly a technical conference 
which some critics called a ‘science fair’ (Standke 2006). The Geneva conference largely 
reflected the un-diminishing techno-optimism of its time. The underlying mood in Geneva was 
that scientific and technological advancement equaled development. Scientists and experts 
dominated the Geneva conference and subsequent UN activities (UNCTAD 1997, Standke 
2006). After the 1963 Geneva conference ECOSOC established an Advisory Committee on the 
Application of Science and Technology for Development (ACAST), which largely consisted of 
individual experts from academies of sciences and national research councils, selected in their 
personal capacity.  
 
In the similar vein, a group of scholars from the Institute of Development Studies and Science 
Policy Research Unit located at the University of Sussex were invited by ACAST to submit a 
report which was originally intended to serve as the introductory chapter for The World Plan of 
Action for the Application of Science and Technology to Development, Proposals for the 2
nd
 
Development Decade. The recommendations of the Sussex group were considered radical, 
earning the document the title of ‘Sussex Manifesto’. However, the ACAST rejected the report for 
inclusion as the opening chapter of the World Plan. The Sussex Manifesto will be discussed 
further in the next section.  
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In 1971 ACAST submitted The World Plan for Action for the Application of Science and 
Technology for Development to the General Assembly highlighting challenges such as the gap 
between scientific and technological potential and its actual use, access to technology, 
indigenous scientific capacity in developing countries, and brain drain. Some of these issues 
later became major points of conflict between North and South in the Second Development 
Decade, especially within UNCTAD. However, some critics believe that because ACAST largely 
consisted of experts and scientists, it had limited access to the political decision-making 
processes and therefore it failed to produce any politically significant results in general 
(Rittberger 1982).  
 
By the time the World Plan was submitted in 1971, the political climate had fundamentally 
changed, with increasing bargaining power of the group of 77, which was constituted during the 
first session of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) in 1964. Also, 
new political lines of explanation of underdevelopment emerged with the rise of the 
‘dependency theory’ critique in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite a diversity of ideological 
positions, dependency scholars uniformly rejected the evolutionist explanation of the 
successive stages of development explained by modernisation theory, for example as 
represented by Rostow (Rostow 1960). In his famous work, Sociology of Development and 
Underdevelopment of Sociology, Andre Gunder Frank pointed out that for Rostow there was no 
stage prior to underdevelopment (Frank 1966). Frank demonstrated that not all contemporary 
‘developed’ societies were ‘underdeveloped’ at some previous moment in history; hence stages 
of development in modernisation theory cannot be accepted as universally true for all societies. 
The dependency school radically shifted the politics of development from developing the 
underdeveloped to, in its most radical version, explaining the development of 
underdevelopment. Dependency theorists showed that the less developed countries were mal-
integrated because of their dependence on exchange relationships which operated to the 
benefit of the developed countries. A number of dependency scholars also discussed how 
western science and technology had an opposite impact on economic development in the less 
developed countries compared to the effect in the industrialised countries (Esteva 1992). 
 
The challenge to modernisation theory did not only come from the dependency school in this 
period. Others also argued that perhaps it was not only important to find out how the ‘aircraft’ of 
development could take off but also to know where it was headed. Rostow’s stages of 
development included a movement from tradition to modernity (Rist 2002).  For Rostow, 
traditional society was degree zero of history, and corresponded to the natural state of 
underdevelopment. Compared with industrial society, traditional society’s basic feature was a 
low level of productivity due to lack of modern technology to exploit nature. At the heart of 
modernisation theory – the linchpin of UN thinking and practices in development for almost two 
decades – was to impart/transfer modern technology to enable traditional and underdeveloped 
societies to make them arrive at the ‘modern destination’ of more production and mass 
consumption. The final stage in Rostow’s evolutionist economics was a society of mass 
production and consumption, in the style of American Fordism (Rist 2002). Anthropologists like 
Marshall Sahlins in his Stone-Age Economics showed that it was not low productivity and lack of 
modern technology but rather the rejection of the idea of accumulation that led some 
traditional societies to reject technology and limit production (Sahlin 1972). During this time, a 
number of studies also pointed out some ill effects of technology transfer leading to the 
movement of appropriate and intermediate technology in the 1970s.  
 
The Sussex Manifesto at the beginning of the second development decade contributed to 
conceiving development in a manner different from the dominant economic theories of the 
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time. The group’s radical contribution lay in going beyond the gap filling and big-push 
frameworks so fashionable at that time, and, also not stopping at pointing out troubles with 
technology transfer. According to the Sussex group, the real problem was not about increasing 
production – as much of the economic theory at that time projected – but to improve the 
capacity to produce. By investing this ‘capacity inherently in people’ of which training and tools 
were just one part, the Sussex group highlighted the importance of how people, knowledge and 
environment interact to produce a particular state of development. ‘It depends on people with 
outlook, knowledge, training and equipment to solve the problems posed by their own 
environment, and thus control their environment rather than be controlled by it’ (Singer et al 
1970). Highlighting the people to which the question of science and technology must be 
related, the Sussex group attributed the causes of underdevelopment not to the lack of science 
and technology, but to the deeper structural and organisational characteristics of the 
developing countries.  
 
By going beyond a critique of technology transfer, the Sussex group pointed out the problematic 
direction in which the world stock of scientific knowledge was being developed at that time. The 
failure of technology transfer to solve local problems was not the only trouble faced by 
developing countries, but also the fact that ’the overall composition of the stock of scientific and 
technological knowledge was becoming notoriously less and less suitable for direct use in 
developing countries’ (Singer et al 1970). It was not only that science and technology 
predominantly addressed the needs of the richer countries, but such concentration also 
resulted in harmful ‘backwash’ effects on the economies of the developing countries. The 
Sussex Manifesto pointed out a case of the manner in which the development of synthetic 
material in the industrialised countries replaced the manufacturing from natural raw material in 
the developing countries and the ways in which this harmfully affected their economies. This 
was later taken up in a big way by the developing countries in the proposal of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). By pointing out how science and technology at that time 
were aimed to fulfill the needs of the richer countries, the Sussex group showed concern about 
the direction of progress of the overall stock of human knowledge. The group therefore 
proposed to increase indigenous science and technology capabilities in developing countries 
and suggested various financial and institutional means by which this could be achieved (Singer 
et al 1970).  
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: ASSERTION BY THE SOUTH 
However, the most forceful challenge to the UN style evolutionist economics finally came 
neither from dependency theorists nor from the anthropologists and critics of technology 
transfer. The charged proposal for the New International Economic Order came from the leaders 
of the G-77. Despite the radical intervention of dependency theorists in questioning 
modernisation theories of economic development, the analytical world was still occupied by the 
category of nation-state, whatever position it occupied – whether developed or 
underdeveloped, centre or periphery, North or South. The NIEO was in many ways an extension 
of the developmental nationalism of the leaders of the South and was aimed at transforming the 
old order of First World dominance and to achieve equity between rich and poor countries by 
radically restructuring the international economic, financial and political relations.  
 
The historical importance of the proposal to create the NIEO is considered an ‘authentic’ Third 
World initiative (Jolly et al 2004) for which leadership was provided by the richer of the 
developing countries – the oil producing countries of Algeria, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela 
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(Rist 2002). Although the NIEO was the first time when the South collectively and forcefully 
asserted its demands in an international arena, the organised expression of the demands of the 
South goes a long way. Gilbert Rist reminds us that in the pre-UN times, Lenin conveyed the 
Congress of the People of the East in 1920, the Congress for the Advancement of the Oppressed 
People was held in Paris in 1920 and another in London in 1923, the first Congress of the 
Oppressed People was organised by the League Against Imperialism in Moscow in 1924, a 
second was held in Brussels in 1927. Closer to the birth of the United Nations, Jawaharlal Nehru 
organised the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, barely a few months before India’s 
independence in 1947.  
 
Arguably, the most important of these conferences was organised in Bandung in Indonesia.  It 
inaugurated the organised and non-aligned demands of the Third World in international politics. 
This conference was organised by Ceylon, Pakistan, India, Burma and Indonesia. Although it had 
thin participation from both Africa and Latin America, its demands manifested strongly in the UN 
resolutions, with most resolute expression in the debate on the NIEO. At the Bandung 
conference, development in the form of South-South cooperation was seen as a rejection of the 
economic imperialism of foreign aid. This was a precursor to what the NIEO would later sanctify 
as ‘collective self-reliance’. Some critics even characterised the debates at the Bandung 
conference as inverted racism (Rist 2002). The Bandung conference was followed by the 
Belgrade conference in 1961 where the term ‘non-alignment’ was defined as the absence of 
political alliance with or against any major power blocks in the cold war. A year later this 
culminated in the formation of the Group of 77 at the occasion of the Economic Conference of 
the Developing Countries at Cairo in 1962. Hence, the proposal of NIEO in the 1970s was but 
one culmination point in a long history of collective assertions by the third world. The 1970s was 
an exciting time for the politics advantage ‘Third Worldism’ (Rist 2002).  
 
The 1970s had a series of political debates -- from the events of May 1968 that rejected Rostow’s 
final stage of development: consumer society and engrained social hierarchies, to the Vietnam 
War, which symbolised a struggle against imperialism -- that were significant for the politics of 
Third Worldism. Challenges to Rostow’s evolutionary view of society came from other directions 
too. The 1970s was also marked by other firsts, including the 1972 UN Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm. This conference was a landmark conference that for the first 
time in human history drew attention to the downsides of technological development. This was 
accompanied by publication of the highly influential The Limits to Growth: Report of the Club of 
Rome (Meadows et al 1971)  The range of radical events in the industrialised countries, the 
Stockholm conference and the Report of the Club of Rome symbolically sent Rostow’s already 
airborne aircraft back to degree zero.  
 
So what exactly was the core philosophy of the NIEO? An examination of sectoral reform in the 
international maritime order offers an interesting example of what was different between the old 
and the new order. The old order of maritime affairs was based on the liberal principle of 
‘freedom of the high seas’, which favoured those who had the capacity to effectively exercise 
this freedom, including the technological means to do so. In contrast, the new order asserted 
national sovereignty over coastal and adjacent waters and proposed political and administrative 
measures for collective regulation, which considerably undermined the old order principle of 
‘freedom of the high sea’. The new order was based on careful negotiation between principles of 
national sovereignty over sea waters and also considered the sea as a common heritage of 
humanity (Rittberger 1982).  
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Similarly, the key demands of the G-77 towards establishing the NIEO included: increasing 
national sovereignty over economies and natural resources, increasing the economic viability of 
manufacturing from raw material as opposed to synthetic material, increasing access to the 
markets of developed countries, reducing the cost of technology transfer, increasing the flow of 
development assistance, and increasing the decision-making power of developing countries in 
the UN and Bretton Woods institutions (Jolly et al 2004).  
CRITIQUES OF THE NIEO 
The NIEO is described as an ambitious attempt to restructure international power relations 
between the industrial and developing countries (Jolly et al 2004). However, by proposing to 
eliminate the widening gap between North and South, the NIEO also alluded to an evolutionary 
view of history. At the heart of the NIEO was in fact yet another version of ‘catching up’. Simply 
put, the NIEO asserted national sovereignty and a share in international resources and trade. It 
neither directly challenged the idea of development envisaged in mainstream economics nor 
discussed the internal state of social and economic inequalities in the developing countries. 
Despite the rhetorical list of demands, the NEIO actually proposed nothing new to improve living 
conditions of the people of the South. In fact, people were significantly absent in the NIEO. While 
existing inequalities between nations were identified as a root cause for underdevelopment, the 
inequalities within the southern systems were not acknowledged.  
 
Some critics suggest that any discussion of inequalities within the South was in fact actively 
prevented (Rist 2002).  In the name of the sovereign interest of States it was decided from the 
outset not to discuss the economic and social system of the countries involved in proposing the 
NIEO. In fact, the most organised of the Third World assertions was not significantly coloured by 
any of the political events of the 1970s, including the Stockholm Conference on Human 
Environment in 1972. The only reference to natural resources in the NIEO was to control them 
better, to exploit them better, and to demand a greater subsidies on products made from natural 
raw materials as opposed to synthetic materials. All in all, some people argue that the NIEO 
actually reinforced the existing order, and the proposal of the NIEO was merely a critique by the 
elites of the South of the international order because it did not allow them to become rich as 
quickly as they would have liked (Rist 2002).  
 
As expected, the proposal of the NIEO was strongly opposed by the elites of the developed 
countries in the UN General Assembly in 1974. The Netherlands, Sweden and Norway showed 
some flexibility but the hard-liner opposition was led by West Germany, and included the USA, 
the UK, Austria, Belgium, Italy and Japan. Despite the protracted battle by the developing 
countries, nothing much was done on the NIEO proposals made by the developing countries, in 
fact the opposite actually happened in international economic development in the subsequent 
decades.  Contrary to the proposals of the NIEO, the greatest surrender of national policies to 
international order happened in the 1980s. In the 1980s, developing countries no longer 
asserted sovereignty over national resources and demanded nationalisation of foreign 
enterprises, but on the contrary, they bent over backward to invite foreign capital and competed 
with one another to offer incentives to use national resources (Jolly et al 2004).  
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THE SECOND CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: VIENNA 1979 
The Vienna Conference on Science and Technology for Development was organised in response 
to the increasing tension between North and South in the context of the proposal of the NIEO. 
Unlike the Geneva conference, the focus in Vienna was political rather than technical. The 
techno-optimism with respect to technology transfer of the 1950s and 1960s could no longer 
be sustained. Vienna was a conference not about transferring technology but asserting 
equitable access to world’s technology.  
 
The institutional arrangements of the Vienna conference reflected these political differences. It 
was described as an ‘ascending process’ (Rittberger 1982) – a sort of worldwide referendum in 
which each member state defined its own science, technology and development priorities 
(Standke 2006). In response to the demand of increasing national sovereignty by the South, the 
conference Secretary-General declared that governments alone should thus influence the 
conference preparations (Standke 2006). The prolonged preparatory period included the 
participation of governmental and intergovernmental organisations, and their negotiations were 
considered an integral component of the conference. The preparations of the conference 
‘ascended’ by negotiating the NIEO in the midst of allegations by the South that the North was 
depoliticising the final conference. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the scientific 
community were kept out of these negotiations, allegations and counter-allegations. Keeping 
NGOs, scientists and experts out was a deliberate attempt to respond to the Southern assertion 
of national sovereignty, to make sure that no transnational consensus among scientists, 
intellectuals or NGOs could be reached across North and South (Rittberger 1982). In the wake of 
later UN conferences greatly influenced by transnational alliances between issue-based political 
groups, the height of tension between North and South leading to the Vienna conference can be 
interpreted as mere assertions by nationalist elite leaders of the developing countries which 
failed to achieve any worthwhile political goal.  
 
Still, underlying the apparent radicalism of the South leading up to the Vienna conference was a 
continuation of the fundamental UN philosophy that the application of science and technology 
can lead to development. The idea of ‘technology transfer’ was replaced by ‘equitable access’, 
yet the era of techno-optimism was not over. Some scholars describe this as isomorphism – the 
underlying philosophy that promoted the adoption of structurally similar forms of science and 
technology throughout the world, the philosophy that presumed universality of science and 
technology for development.  
 
Any approach that questioned this fundamental assumption was kept out of the UN debates or 
given marginal space at best. Two such approaches – the global problems approach and social 
control approach – were greatly marginalised during the Vienna processes. Both these 
approaches lacked strong support from both North and South. The global problem approach 
proposed setting of standards and goals for development, and mobilising social efforts and 
material resources at both national and international levels to achieve these goals and 
standards. Science and technology were considered distribution-indifferent instruments. This 
approach proposed international cooperation for problem solving, however, the South still 
viewed this approach as biased towards the technologically advanced partners (Rittberger 1982).  
 
The social control approach would not have been included in the Vienna conference document 
without the support provided by the Nordic countries. This approach recommended setting 
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standards and addressing the patterns of mal-distribution in a way that implied a strong criticism 
of existing social and political practices in all countries in both South and North. This approach 
was particularly opposed by developing countries because it highlighted the disparities in the 
use of and access to science and technology within nations. Furthermore, collective 
international action would have meant a far-reaching encroachment on national sovereignty 
across North and South (Rittberger 1982). The period from Geneva to Vienna was the first time 
when abuse, mal-distribution and injurious social consequences of science and technology were 
highlighted in UN processes, which was not appreciated by either the developing or 
industrialised countries (Rittberger 1982).  
 
Finally, the failure of the Vienna Programme of Action – that proposed strengthening science 
and technology capacities of developing countries, restructuring existing international relations 
in the transfer of technology, and promoting new ways of technology cooperation between 
North and South – is attributed to the lack of financial commitments. Following the Vienna 
conference, an Intergovernmental Committee was created in the UN General Assembly but its 
actions were financed only through voluntary contributions from the industrialised countries 
(UNCTAD 1997, Standke 2006).  
 
Despite its failure to achieve anything significant for the North-South relationship on science, 
technology and development, there were two substantive outcomes of the Vienna conference. 
The notion of technology transfer for development took backstage in favour of building 
endogenous capacities within developing countries (UNCTAD 1997), as also proposed by the 
Sussex Manifesto almost a decade prior (Singer et al 1970). In the 1980s countries like India, 
hitherto so dependent upon technology transfer from international institutions - for instance, 
for its Green revolution programme -- started to build elaborate in-country institutions.  
 
The second outcome heralded a whole new era in UN practices on science and technology for 
development based on evaluation studies conducted by Stanley Foundation and other agencies. 
The evaluation study conducted by the Stanley Foundation questioned the state-led approach 
of the Vienna conference and proposed the involvement of real actors, including scientists, 
experts, private enterprises and even multinational corporations (UNCTAD 1997). These actors, 
including the transnational non-governmental organisations, have since played a key role not 
only in UN processes but in other international negotiations on science and technology for 
development. The scientific community (as per the Geneva approach) and governments (as in 
Vienna) were no longer seen as the primary actors. Instead, a complex scenario emerged 
involving a multitude of stakeholders. Despite these departures, both Geneva and Vienna are 
remembered as failures of both technology-fix and policy-fix approaches to science and 
technology-led development (Standke 2006).  
DEATH OF DEVELOPMENT: 1980S  
Development was widely (metaphorically) considered ‘dead’ in the 1980s. And, it is well-known 
now, this period was also marked by ‘the end of history’ at the end of Cold War soon after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall. In the next couple of decades, development was reincarnated through an 
attempted marriage with sustainability, while the world became increasingly interconnected and 
globalised, North to South. The UN soon left the confining span of development decades and 
expanded its goals to the era of Millennia.     
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The 1980s are often declared as a lost decade on multiple counts. The whole decade shrunk 
while making a transition from the post-World War II era of the state-led developmentalism to 
the neo-liberal counterrevolution in the context of the debt crisis. In debates on development, it 
is common to jump from the heyday of state-led neo-Keynesian interventionism of the 1970s 
straight to the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s accompanied by liberalisation and 
globalisation (gratis Washington Consensus).  
 
Referring to this transition (and the missing decade), Gill Hart makes a dialectically 
interconnected distinction between ‘Big D’ development and ‘little d’ development (Hart 2002). 
Big D refers to the post-World War II interventions in the Third World that emerged in the context 
of the Cold War and decolonisation. ‘Little d’ refers to the development of ‘capitalism as 
geographically uneven, profoundly contradictory historical processes’ (Hart 2001:650). Hart’s 
D/d distinction alludes to Karl Polanyi’s contributions on capitalism’s ‘double movement’. In his 
book The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (1944), Polanyi 
looked at the history of the self-regulating market, supposedly a utopian or ideal form of 
capitalism, in nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain.  
 
The self-regulating market was a society-wide market system in which all inputs and outputs to 
the production process were subjected to exchange and sales.  Distributive justice, kindness or 
compassion had no place or value in the self-regulating market. The Great Transformation shows 
how the self-regulating market did not survive. The utopian nature of the self-regulating market 
gave rise to a counter-movement, which in turn led to administrative efforts and legislative 
reforms intended to control the negative effects of self-regulation. The self-regulating market 
collapsed during the first half of the nineteenth century – not as a result of the rise of the 
working class in the Marxian way – but because of the bankers, merchants and land owners 
whose interests were threatened by fluctuations in trade, and who joined workers in demanding 
regulatory protection. Polanyi maintained that these opposing tendencies of self-regulation and 
demand for protection are inherent within capitalism.  
 
Following Polanyian perspectives, the neo-liberal Washington consensus, post-development 
critiques, post-Washington consensus (development with a human face), and the environmental 
critique of development are all expressions of opposing forces contained within capitalism. The 
decades of the 1990s and 2000s are marked by a ‘playing out’ of these opposing tendencies of 
capitalism in international arenas, including the UN. On one side, these decades witnessed 
structural adjustment, liberalisation and globalisation in an unprecedented manner, on the 
other, emerged environmentalism and ‘development with human face’. In which direction have 
these opposing tendencies elicited change?  The key UN events and historical moments on 
environmentalism and its impact on the notion of development are briefly reviewed below and 
then related to Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ in the conclusion.  
BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENT 
One of the most important expressions of Polanyi’s ‘opposing tendencies’ was the rise (and fall) 
of environment in the development debates of the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s 
there were several attempts to force a marriage between environment and development. In the 
years following the Stockholm Conference (1972) terms like ‘environment and development’ 
emerged; ‘development without destruction’, ‘environmentally sound development’, and ’eco-
development’, which appeared in the UN Environment Programme Review in 1978.  The most 
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ingenuous of all these terminological innovations has been the contribution of the Brundtland 
Commission – ‘sustainable development’.  
 
In 1983 the General Assembly of the UN asked the Secretary-General to appoint a World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). The commission under the 
chairwomanship of Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland submitted its famous report Our Common 
Future in 1986.  Although environment was not entirely a new subject for the UN, having 
organised a World Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 in Stockholm, the task in 
front of the Brundtland Commission was difficult, fraught with reconciling two forces seen as 
mostly opposing – environmental protection and development. Dealing with environment, the 
report gives an almost exhaustive list of threats to the planet’s ecological equilibrium, but it falls 
flat in assessing the sources and causes of these threats. The main contradiction of the 
Brundtland Commission report is the failure to historically associate the existing economic 
growth policies and the increasing gulf between rich and poor with the environmental 
degradation.   
 
The Commission’s most interesting terminological innovation ‘sustainable development’ is often 
criticised as dangerously vague, elusive, an oxymoron or a cliché (Rist 2002). The initial 
vagueness soon became a breeding ground for disagreements from being a basis for consensus. 
Despite the fact that the Brundtland Commission failed to generate any worthwhile critique of 
development from the perspective of environmental sustainability, it had two unintended 
consequences. The notion of equity, which was previously a point of contention between North 
and South, and considered contingent upon limited access to technology, was now transported 
to the arena of future. The key statement of Our Common Future (1986), ‘Sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ not only made development contingent 
upon the limits of nature but stretched the temporality of development to the future. The fact 
that both North and South share a common future and nature shifted the focus of UN debates 
significantly from the nation-states to a wider range of socio-cultural communities, both in 
North and South, and examined the way these communities engaged with the environment. It 
can be argued that the Brundtland Commission opened up an opportunity to shift the focus of 
inquiry from understanding how the misfortunes of the South were produced by the greed of 
the North to understanding the environmental impact of the lifestyle of rich in both South and 
North.  
 
The report of the Brundtland Commission ended with a suggestion that the UN organised an 
international conference on environment and development. More than one hundred heads of 
state and representatives of a thousand NGOs assembled in Rio de Janeiro between 3 and 14 
June 1992 to take part in the Earth Summit – the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development. With eight thousand journalists, altogether thirty thousand people attended the 
conference. Alongside the official event at Rio, an unofficial UNCED event called the Global 
Forum brought together nearly twenty thousand additional people from NGOs. The Earth 
Summit’s mandate was to reconcile environment with development.  
 
The Rio Declaration, called the Earth Charter proclaimed twenty-seven principles including the 
right of every country to control its own resources and the right to development. The Charter 
included the commitment to reduce consumption patterns conflicting with sustainable 
development, following the principle of ‘polluter pays’ and the precautionary principle. At Rio, 
text that had drafted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988 was also 
accepted, despite the USA walking out in rejection of the clause that the carbon dioxide 
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emissions be reduced to 1990 levels by 2000. The Rio Conference also adopted a convention on 
biodiversity, a declaration on forests, and a convention on desertification. Rio is viewed as the 
high point in the last thirty years of environmental diplomacy (Rist 2002).  
RIO PLUS EIGHTEEN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN 
MALAISE? 
Where do we stand after Rio plus eighteen years of globalisation? Some critics describe global 
environmental politics today as in the state of malaise (Najam 2002). For countries from the 
South, a key manifestation of the outputs of the Rio Conference was the so-called ‘Rio bargain’. 
The developing countries came to Rio rather reluctantly, fearing that the environment would be 
used as a reason to stall development in their countries. The concept of sustainable 
development and a set of principles on global environmental agreements adopted at Rio 
provided an opportunity for a grand North-South bargain, the conflict between these political 
blocks languishing since the NIEO debate in the 1970s.  
 
The Rio bargain laid out three interrelated principles – ‘additionality’, ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’, and the ‘polluter pays’ principle. The additionality principle was adopted to 
respond to the Southern fear that environmental issues would attract international aid away 
from traditional development issues. First it was promised that new funds will be made available 
to tackle environmental issues. Accordingly, the Global Environmental Facility was established 
on the insistence of the African countries. However, during the negotiations on the 
desertification convention, it became clear that no additional fund would actually be made 
available. Later, a global mechanism was established to better manage existing resources and 
the rest was more or less left to market forces.  
 
The second such principle – ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ – was adopted to resolve 
the long standing argument between South and North that the principal responsibility on 
environmental actions should be differentiated in proportion to the responsibility of those who 
created the problem. The South argued for a notion of greater Northern responsibility since 
before the Stockholm Conference of 1972.  A major assault on this principle occurred when the 
US refused to accept mandatory targets for carbon reduction unless similar restrictions were 
placed on major developing countries such as India and China.  
 
The third – ‘polluter pays’ principle did not emerge from the South, rather it has deep roots in 
domestic environmental policy in the North, including in the United States. However, this 
principle has taken a twisted turn since Rio. In fact, highly controversial alternatives have come 
out in the name of this principle. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) that came out of 
the Kyoto agreement allows industrialised countries to compensate their greenhouse emissions 
by investing in emission reduction projects in the South, which are likely to be cheaper. In the 
name of efficiency and convenience to the polluter, the CDM transfers the moral responsibility 
of reducing emissions to those who already have low emissions. The polluter pays principle is 
grossly violated in CDM because CDM provides convenience to the polluter instead of changing 
the polluting behaviour. Such measures are visible in the adaptation regimes emerging from the 
climate change, desertification and biodiversity debates. A significant number of these 
programmes promote behaviour change in the South while preserving the damaging and 
polluting behaviour patterns in the North (Najam 2002). The increasing emphasis on behaviour 
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change in the South couched as a mechanism for poverty reduction also borders dangerously 
on entailing newer forms of cultural and economic imperialism.  
 
The erosion of the conceptual building blocks of the Rio bargain is not the only contributor to 
the growing sense of malaise about global environmental policy. Most of the environmental 
policies agreed at Rio have led nowhere. The NGOs surrounding the Rio process have become 
large and instrumentalised by TNCs or have remained small and struggling. TNCs themselves 
had a boom in the 1990s due to the neo-liberal counterrevolution and globalisation. 
Environmentally destructive industrial development based on fossil fuels has in fact expanded 
due to free trade and economic liberalisation. Nation-states from the South have been subjected 
to intense pressure from economic globalisation and associated processes of structural 
adjustment. The international institutional system, including the UN, has undergone substantial 
transformation since Rio (Finger 2002).  
 
Despite the dismal implementation of the Rio agreement, the most important legacy of the Rio 
conference lies in the very nature of the preparatory process, which involved a wide range of 
political actors and stakeholders (Mebratu 1998), and a great deal of deliberation and 
negotiation before, during and after the conference. These political processes around the Rio 
conference heralded a whole new era of public and policy imagination on environment and 
development. Yet, another source of malaise in global policy is emerging from the fact that the 
UN has not only abandoned such preparatory processes but also done away with involving 
political actors from both North and South towards preparing important policy documents. 
Today, international environmental policymaking has become the realm of experts only.  
THE ERA OF EXPERT ASSESSMENTS 
Thirty years after the World Plan of Action and the UN resolution on NIEO, twenty years after the 
Vienna Programme of Action, and thirteen years after the Rio conference – all of these achieved 
through elaborate and participatory political processes – a special task force appointed by the 
UN as a part of the Millennium Initiatives recently presented a report, The Millennium Project: 
Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation in 2005 (Juma and Yee-Cheong 2005). The 
Task Force is an independent advisory body commissioned by the UN Secretary-General to 
propose ways and means to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At present the 
Millennium Development Goals constitute the main frame for UN activities – comparable to the 
initiative of development decades in the 1960s and 1970s. The Millennium Report on the MDGs 
was prepared by 250 leading world practitioners. The preparation of the report did not entail a 
close interaction between the UN, UN agencies, national governments, and representatives of 
non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations as it had in the past. Klaus-Heinrich 
Standke, who served as Director of Science and Technology at the UN’s New York office 
complains that, ’….. neither the need to safeguard through a core-group of high-level experts 
some sort of institutionalised memory nor the long-time cherished need for the geographical 
balance in the membership of groups providing expert advice seem to be any longer of particular 
importance [to the UN]’ (Standke 2006).  
 
The Millennium Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation is meant to help achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals. The UN organised a Millennium Summit in 2000 where eight 
goals were agreed by 191 member countries, to be fulfilled by 2015. These goals although 
agreed by developing countries, were not initiated by the South, but were pushed by the US, 
Europe and Japan, co-sponsored by the World Bank, IMF and the Organisation of Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD). The preparation of the MDGs document did not involve 
any political participation from the South, in fact Ted Gordon, the well-known consultant for the 
USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drafted the goals (Amin 2006). However, the MDGs were 
adopted by consensus in the UN General Assembly. Such forms of achieving consensus is 
opposite to previous UN traditions in which such texts were discussed at length, and each word 
was contested before a carefully prepared draft was presented in the General Assembly. Samir 
Amin describes the UN as now ‘fully domesticated’ by the United States, Europe and Japan (Amin 
2006).  
 
Although all eight goals to be fulfilled by 2015 are based on measurable indicators, and all are 
certainly commendable, their definitions are often extremely vague. Most crucially, debates 
concerning the conditions for achieving these goals are missing. It is assumed that economic 
liberalism and a free market will take care of the how part of the MDGs. Extreme forms of 
privatisation, total respect for intellectual property rights of the TNCs and global cooperation 
between North and South to establish an open and multilateral commercial and financial 
system) are the mantras that have been repeated in The Millennium Report and in The Report of 
the Millennium Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation. Amin accuses the MDGs and 
associated programmes as driven by priorities and interests of dominant globalised Capital, 
having nothing to do with poverty reduction. Other critics also severely criticise the manner in 
which the goals have been selected and how the ultimate goal of developing a ‘global 
partnership between North and South for development’ becomes an imperative for promoting 
technocratic prioritisation of economic means (Khoo 2005).  
 
Evidence for similar critique is also visible in two crucial shifts surrounding science and 
technology for development. In stark contrast to the negotiations around the Geneva and 
Vienna Conferences, which revolved around the political question of how best to distribute the 
benefits of science and technology equitably among all nations, the Millennium Task Force 
makes development merely a problem of generating global innovation capacity in cooperation 
with the private sector. Development has thus become a matter of innovation of new 
technologies. The Millennium Task Force therefore focuses solely on new and emerging 
technologies such as ICTs, biotechnology, nanotechnology and new materials. A second 
important departure pertains to the distinction between developed and developing countries. 
The report proposes that the policy makers draw from the global pool of lessons and avoid 
artificial classification of countries and instead promote international partnership. The report 
thus obliterates the historical and political differences between the North and South.  
 
The UN has now specialised in conducting expert assessments with stakeholder engagement. 
John Thompson describes these assessments, conducted by mobilising vast institutional, 
technical, and financial resources, as exercises in ’building consensus towards scientifically 
informed policy making’, which although are presented as transparent and objective, they often 
overlook the politics of knowledge and debates on legitimacy and credibility of different points 
of views (Thompson 2008). Thompson briefly discusses three such assessments – the 
International Panel on Climate Change is a scientific body established in 1988 by the World 
Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to 
evaluate the risk of climate change caused by human activity; the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment was launched in 2001, it involved 1360 experts and was aimed at assessing 
ecosystem changes and projecting these changes into the future; and the latest and most 
controversial of such assessments, the International Assessment of Agricultural Science and 
Technology (IAASTD) was initiated on the request of international biotechnology companies to 
assess the appropriateness of genetically modified crops for the developing countries.  
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Talking specifically about the latest and the most controversial of these assessments, the 
mandate of IAASTD eventually expanded to assessing the entire range of agricultural 
technologies and policies and their relevance for agricultural development in the 21
st
 century. 
The IAASTD assessment was sponsored by a number of international agencies, including UNDP, 
UNEP and UNESCO, and was financially supported by the private sector and a range of Northern 
countries. The exercise involved 800 stakeholder organisations and the final report was drafted 
by 400 authors based on evidence provided by thousands of experts worldwide (Thompson 
2008). The findings of IAASTD are controversial because the exercise was initiated with an aim to 
find scientifically informed and objective assessment of agricultural technologies and policies, 
however, the outcome of the exercise has been surprisingly political. The IAASTD report 
proposed a fundamental rethinking of current agricultural knowledge, science, and technology 
(AKST) and proposed a new, farmer-centred paradigm. It also questioned whether market forces 
alone can deliver food security, acknowledged that international trade rules unfairly favour rich 
countries, and proposed reform of multinational corporations. These findings, however, were not 
based on consensus among experts, contrary to what the exercise intended to achieve in the 
first place. Conflicts erupted during the review process when major biotech companies and GM 
advocates pulled out of the exercise (Thompson 2008).  
 
Despite the surprising outcome of the IAASTD, it may be pertinent to recount three important 
differences between the current expert-driven international assessments and past UN practices. 
1) Most importantly, these exercises are oriented towards assessing the risk of present and past 
activities on the future and nature. Risk here is assumed as a matter of scientific judgement, and 
hence science plays a pivotal role in shaping these assessments. Science is assumed as neutral 
and objective, which Thompson (2008) calls a ‘smokescreen that obscures and excludes 
competing agendas and conflicting perspectives of different epistemic communities’.  2) 
Secondly, the assumed scientific objectivity behind these exercises creates another 
smokescreen – political neutrality. Not only that the diverse expert epistemic communities are 
denied comparable political positions, but these exercises do not guarantee political 
representation from the South. Although IAASTD was conducted by a range of international 
organisations, it was financially sponsored by the multinational corporations and Northern 
governments. In the absence of assured political representations of either Southern 
governments or political groups representing marginal interests, whether or not these exercises 
would eventually take positions in favour of marginal interests is purely a matter of chance. The 
Millennium Report and Task Force, other expert driven exercises had contradictory messages to 
the findings of the IAASTD. The outcome of these international assessments is thus contingent 
upon who heads such exercises, who are allowed to participate, and whose views are finally 
represented. 3) Thirdly, these assessments no longer centrally address the issues of equity and 
distribution as past UN deliberations attempted.  As Amin (2006) says, the only social cause 
allowed in these massive exercises is poverty alleviation. Poverty however is viewed as if it is a 
natural state of affairs without any connection with the historical and social processes of 
unequal distribution of wealth.  
 
Referring to the rejection of the North’s propositions both in the streets and among heads of the 
states in Seattle in 1998, Amin hints that the epicentre of political resistance from the south has 
now shifted from the UN to negotiations in the World Trade Organisation. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS  
It can be argued that the UN remains largely ineffective in making international policy on 
science and technology for development that is just, equitable and sustainable. In reality, the 
Bretton Woods institutions had a lasting impact in driving the global economy in a neo-liberal 
direction, and influencing UN policies and practices. Such a conclusion however is unfairly 
pessimistic. Instead, the UN debates should be read as an expression of inherent tension 
between opposite forces that Karl Polanyi called ‘double movement’. Polanyi posited that the 
dynamic of modern society was governed by a double movement where the continuous 
expansion of the market was met by a countermovement checking its expansion. For Polanyi 
this double movement was the result of interplay between two fundamental principles on which 
modern society is based – the principle of economic liberalism and the principle of self-
protection. Polanyi proposed that the countermovement is more than the usual defensive 
behaviour of society; it is a reaction against dislocation; an intrinsic reaction of society to 
preserve both its social fabric and its productive organisation. Polanyi attributed the tendency to 
countermovement not only to marginal classes or the proletariat in the Marxist way, but also to 
the whole society. In fact, Polanyi argued that the self-regulating market in early twentieth 
century England collapsed as a result of merchants, bankers and traders joining the working 
class in demanding protection from the state.  
 
The UN is an international arena where this inherent and paradoxical tension between currents 
and countercurrents played out. Whether or not these debates resulted in policy change, the 
expression of these movements and counter-movements have put indelible marks on public 
and policy imaginations of science, technology, environment and development in international 
arena. For instance, the geographical expansion of capitalism was countered by the 
protectionism of the Third World in the post-World War II era; the North’s globalism was 
countered by the South’s assertion of national sovereignty; techno-optimism of the early UN 
days was checked by critics highlighting the limits of technology; and finally, the model of 
unlimited growth propounded by modernisation theory was countered by a range of counter-
political currents, including the debates on environmental sustainability. The importance of the 
UN in our times is in providing international space for the expression of alternative and often 
conflicting public and policy imagination.  
 
The Sussex Manifesto was also one such counter-movement that contributed in shaping an 
alternative imagination. The sequel to the 1970 Sussex Manifesto would also hopefully add a few 
more colours to the rainbow of counter-imagination.  
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